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Involuntary Treatment 
of Drug Addiction 
Robert G Newman MD 
Controversy surrounding the complex issues 
involved in the compulsory treatment of addicts is by no 
means new. Statutes explicitly substituting compulsory 
"treatment" for criminal penalties in the case of addicts 
charged with criminal offenses, and providing for the 
involuntary commitment of addicts upon civil complaint, 
first appeared in 1961 in California, and then in New York, 
Massachusetts, and Maryland, as well as on the Federal 
level. 1 But given society's present concern with the "drug 
problem," it is inevitable that, as the waiting lists of 
applicants for voluntary treatment programs are eliminated 
by the expansion of these latter programs, the debate over 
involuntary treatment will grow. 
The premise underlying the position that. 
addicts should be forced to undergo treatment for their 
own good is that they are sick and thus in need of the 
treatment which we wish to impose against their will. Yet 
no physical ailment is universally found among narcotics 
addicts. The conditions under which addicts on the street 
are forced, under present law, to secure and administer 
opiates substantially increases their chances of contracting 
hepatitis and a variety of bacterial infections. But it has 
long been known that no physical deterioration results 
from the prolonged use, in itself, of opiates. 2 Since there is· 
no universally identifiable physical ailment present among 
addicts, the illness we purport to "cure" must be mental, 
and addicts (like all mental patients) are essentially 
powerless to refute the diagnosis. In fact, protestations are 
considered further confirmation of both the psycho-
pathology which is said to exist, and its severity, since it is a 
well known adage that inability to recognize and accept 
one's own illness proves just how sick one really is! 
The process of labelling addicts mentally sick, 
and the conclusion drawn from this generalization, is 
summed up as follows: 
In recent years, professionals, nonprofessionals, 
and groups best designated unprofessionals, 
have taken to viewing drug abuse as a symptom 
of psychopathology necessitating verbal and/or 
chemotherapeutic intervention .... The main 
point is that once we view the drug abuser as 
being sick, we automatically fall into the trap 
of assuming and recommending 'treatment' for 
him. The choice between traditional and avant 
garde modalities is but a minor one once our 
initial perception is set of the person and his 
'problem.'3 
1 Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code 3 S. Einstein and W. Garitano, Treating 
the Drug Abuser: problems, factors, and 
alternatives, 7 The International Journal 
of the Addictions 324, no. 2 (1972). 
§ §3050-3054, 3100-3111. (West) N.Y. 
Mental Hygiene Law § § 81.13, 81.21, 
81.23 (McKinney) Md. Ann. Code 
Article 438, § § 9, 12. 18 U.S.C. 
§ §4251-4255, 42 u.s.c. 
§ §3411-3426. The Massachusetts 
involuntary commitment program, Mass. 
Ann. Laws ch. lllA, § §·1-10, was 
repealed in 1969. 
2 E. Brecher et al., Licit and Illicit Drugs 
(1972), at 21-32. 
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Generalizations applied to addicts are 
immediately suspect, since the addicted universe itself is so 
ill-defined. People are deemed addicts on the basis of 
laboratory tests which give an indication only of recent (as 
opposed to habitual) drug use. This "objective" measure is 
then supported by medical examination, which is generally 
cursory and inconclusive, and by a past social-medical 
his~ory whic~ ~s notoriously unreliable, especially when the 
patlent-pract1tloner relationship is not voluntary. 
Nevertheless, physicians who accept the notion 
that all addicts are psychologically ill are at no loss for 
specific diagnoses of individual patients. One study of 91 
women addicts, for instance, reported every single subject 
t~ be suffering from either brain syndrome, psychotic 
disorder, psychoneurotic disorder, personality pattern 
disorder, personality trait disorder or sociopathic person-
ality disorder. 4 
Empirical evidence, however, such as the 
well-documented success of methadone maintenance 
treatment of heroin addicts5 , refutes the contention that 
addiction must be associated with some form of psycho-
pathology. Most methadone maintenance programs, in 
assisting a large proportion of their voluntary patients to 
return to a productive role in society, supplement the 
medication itself with pragmatic counseling aimed at 
external problems such as housing, employment, legal cases, 
etc., rather than with psychotherapy.6 
Nevertheless, there is considerable appeal in 
attributing the growing use of illicit drugs to psychological 
illness of the addicts themselves. Indeed, "blaming the 
victim"' is a traditional response to social ills (the classic 
example of this approach is the conclusion that malnutri-
tion among the poor is due to the fact that " ... low 
income families place less value on food than we think. ")8 
Political realities explain the attractiveness of seeking both 
the cause and the cure for addiction within the addict 
himself. As difficult as may be the task of rounding up drug 
addicts against whom one imposes nominally therapeutic 
measures, it is far easier than attempting to change the 
socio-economic and other external factors which play a 
role. Compulsory treatment, by focusing on real or 
imagined short-comings within the addict, serves to draw 
attention away from these environmental problems, and the 
result must inevitably be counter-productive. 
"I'll make him an offer 
he can't refuse." 9 
The "diversion" of addicts from the criminal 
ju~tice s~stem to a treatment setting, purporting to deal 
with addict-offenders as "patients" rather than as criminals 
has been heralded as an enlightened, humane alternative to' 
an expensive and ineffective prison stay. There are several 
mechanisms by which the criminal justice system forces 
addi~ts .in to treatment. In many situations the court, upon 
conviction of an addict, may impose a sentence which 
speci~cally mandates a term in a treatment facility in lieu 
of pnson. Such terms can extend either for an indefinite 
period of time, depending upon the "progress" perceived 
by the clinician, or for a minimum duration which 
frequently exceeds the longest sentence possible for the 
criminal act itself. 10 
The other common diversion technique offers a 
"choice" to the addict: either stay in prison, or "vol-
untarily" request release which will be conditioned upon 
entering and remaining in a specified treatment program. 
This practice is particularly invidious when it is applied (as 
is increasingly the case) to the pre'. trial addict-prisoner 
whose alleged offense is compounded by his inability to 
obtain bail money. Frequently, the prosecutor's agreement 
to the release of defendants is reserved for those persons 
whose charges are relatively minor (i.e., misdemeanor and 
low-degree, drug-related felonies). 
Those involved, therefore, are primarily poor 
people, arrested on charges of which they are presumed 
innocent under the law, and which, even upon conviction, 
would carry comparatively short sentences. They are 
"offered the opportunity" to enter a treatment program 
they may or may not want or need, and which will in any 
event provide society with the means of observing and 
controlling their activities for an extended period of time. 
Such coercion of legally innocent detainees is possible since 
overcrowded court calendars and other delays inherent in 
the judicial process make virtually any alternative more 
attractive than continued incarceration while awaiting trial. 
Incredibly, it is in precisely these cases that advocates 
embrace diversion as an especially humane and appropriate 
expedient. 
4 C. Chambers, R. N. Hinesley, and M. 8 U.S. Department of Agriculture, quoted 
by E. Drew in Going Hungry in 
America; government's failure, The 
Atlantic Monthly 53, at 55 (December 
1968). , 
Moldestad, Narcotic Addiction in 
Females, 5 The International Journal of 
the Addictions 274, no. 2 (1970). 
S F. Gearing, in Proceedings of the Fourth 
Natio111ll Conference on Methadone 
Treatment, NAPAN, at 157 (1972). 
6 H. Joseph and V. Dole, Methadone 
Patients on Probation and Parole, 34 
Federal Probation 42, and 44, no. 2 
(June, 1970). 
7 W. Ryan, Blaming the Victim (l 972). 
9 Don Corleone in Mario Puzo, The 
Godfather, 39 (1969). 
10 J. Delong, Treatment and Rehabili-
tation, in Dealing with Drug Abuse-A 
Report to the Ford Foundation, 186 
(1972). 
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Those who work in the criminal justice system 
are inevitably plagued by the knowledge that while prisons 
do not as a rule "correct" anybody, simply releasing 
convicted criminals without punishment is not feasible. The 
tempting middle road with addict-defendants is to force 
them, under threat of imprisonment, to enter a treatment 
facility with the assurance that the clinical staff will 
promptly report abscondence or continued involvement in 
"anti-social" activities. 
The attractiveness of such an approach is that it 
seems to offer something to everyone: the problem of 
ineffective and overcrowded jails is addressed; the judge is 
reasonably secure in the belief that the treatment facility 
staff will closely monitor the addict's behavior; the addict 
has been permitted to escape prison confinement, at least 
temporarily, for a more subtle (though perhaps longer) 
punishment; and finally, the treatment center frequently 
welcomes the added "business" and often believes that it 
will be more successful in dealing with what amounts to a 
captive population. 
In fact, this type of program is a perversion of 
the role of all the parties concerned. The judge engages in 
inequitable justice by providing different punishment to 
different people convicted of the same offense, merely 
because one happens to be an addict and is deemed 
"treatable" and the other is not. Also, the judge imposes as 
the primary criterion of continued release attendance at a 
facility which may or may not offer society (let alone the 
addict) any benefits. The basic premise underlying such 
conditional release is that there is an inherent value in being 
in a treatment program this assumption is as invalid as the 
belief that there is an inherent virtue in being a member of 
a particular religion, or political party, or any other group. 
Finally the judge is left with the task of deciding which 
type of treatment program should be required, a clinical 
decision for which he is usually totally unqualifed, and 
which will depend more on personal bias than on objective 
determination. 
The clinical staff, in agreeing to share the 
responsibilities of the criminal justice system, can not meet 
its primary obligation to the patient. It thereby severely 
compromises its ability to serve either patients or the 
community. Clinical judgment is also compromised, since 
medical decisions (to terminate treatment, for instance) can 
and generally do lead to inevitable criminal sanctions 
against the client. 
The addict-defendant, who has not yet been 
tried or convicted, forfeits the opportunity to prove his 
innocence by accepting treatment in lieu of prosecution 
and the attendent pre-trial incarceration. Moreover, the 
addi~t, forced to accept "treatment" which he generally 
does not want for an "illness" which he more often than 
not believes is non-existent, is not impressed with the 
argument that he is being deprived of his liberty for his own 
good. He generally perceives "treatment" as simply another 
form of punishment, if indeed he sees any difference from a 
criminal sentence whatever. Proponents of compulsory 
treatment acknowledge this, and cite it as an argument for, 
rather than against, depriving the addict of a choice. The 
addict's perception that he is being punished, rather than 
helped, seems to be shared by the lay press, as evidenced by 
phraseology such as the following: 
4 Escape Yonkers Narco Center 
Police yesterday were seeking four inmates who 
escaped Sunday night from the ... Rehabilita-
tion Center in Yonkers .... A fifth was 
captured by a guard at the Center shortly after 
the break. 11 (emphasis added) In the 
Therapeutic State toward which we appear to 
be moving, the principle requisite for the role 
'of Big Brother may be an MD degree. 12 
The causes of drug addiction are as complex as 
society itself, and they must be faced directly. The analogy 
is frequently made between drug addiction and contagious 
disease. In that context, it should be noted that even where 
a readily defined illness exists (which is not the case with 
addiction), and even where the illness can be effectively 
cured by appropriate treatment (which also is not the case 
with addiction), elimination of the problem from a 
community generally requires far broader measures. Thus, 
tuberculosis was brought under control not by the 
introduction of chemotherapeutic agents, but by a 
substantial improvement in living conditions; in areas where 
that improvement has not occurred, the disease persists 
despite the medication which is available. Venereal disease 
is also widespread throughout the world, even though each 
individual patient can be readily diagnosed and cured. 
Similarly, we must recognize that addiction is a social 
problem which will never be eliminated by measures that 
are imposed on the addicts themselves, and until this is 
understood our effectiveness in dealing with drug abuse will 
. remain severely limited. 
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The nature of the therapeutic relation between 
doctor and patient is greatly affected, needless to say, by 
the manner in which the patient comes to be the recipient 
of treatment. The voluntary character of that relationship is 
by no means precluded by the existence of outside 
pressures on the patient. Rather the word "voluntary" 
" ... implies the exercise of one's free choice or will ... 
whether or not external influences are at work." 13 
(emphasis added) The difficulty, of course, is determining 
what constitutes "free choice." However unappealing the 
alternative presented, the addict nevertheless always retains 
the option of choosing the sanction associated with not 
entering a treatment program. One could thus argue that 
there are only voluntary patients and those others punished 
for failing to volunteer, but no involuntary patients. Such 
an argument, however, ignores the loss of freedom we feel 
when coerced into choosing between two disagreeable 
courses of action. To avoid this sterile conclusion it is 
necessary to define voluntarism pragmatically in terms of 
the relationship which exists between patient and 
practitioner. 
In all treatment relations, society is an 
interested third party. But the extent to which society's 
interests intrude in the individual case is nonetheless crucial 
to the nature of the resultant therapeutic interaction. 
Voluntary treatment describes a therapeutic relationship in 
which the primary responsibility of the clinician is to the 
patient. In an involuntary treatment setting the clinician's 
primary responsibility is to some third party. An obligation, 
as in the statutory treatment schemes for addicts, to report 
patient attendance, progress or termination to an outside 
individual or agency defines the relationship as involuntary, 
even if patients are induced to sign, in advance, open-ended 
authorizations for such reports. 
The physical environment in which treatment is 
forced on people, whether behind bars, in a locked 
residential setting, or in a neighborhood store-front serving 
ambulatory patients, is to a large extent determined by the 
modality which is favored in a'particular instance. But 
which mode of treatment is imposed in no way changes its 
involuntary character. 
Legal experts may argue over the constitu-
tionality of involuntary treatment of addicts. Politicians 
and the lay public may weigh the desirability and the 
dangers of such treatment. Economists may enter into 
heated debates over its absolute and relative cost-effec-
tiveness. But the clinician who accepts patients rendered 
powerless to refuse his services by legislative fiat (as 
opposed to medical incapacity), must be viewed in the role 
of persecutor. Rationalizations should not obscure the 
issue: in dealing with an unwilling subject, a doctor is by 
definition striving to bring about a change which the 
patient does not wish, but which the government has 
mandated. He accepts payment from society in order to 
work against the perceived self-interest expressed by the 
patient; in such instances, the concepts of treatment and 
cure lose all meaning. 
There are legal restraints against an internist 
who, in his professional wisdom, may be tempted to 
imprison a diabetic who fails to adhere to a prescribed diet. 
A surgeon, recognizing the inevitable consequences of 
ignoring a malignancy, is nevertheless restrained by 
professional as well as legal sanctions from operating on a 
cancer_ patient without informed consent. The seemingly 
· self-evident nature of these examples would indicate that 
the medical profession has made considerable progress since 
the late 1930s, when a physician performed tubal ligation 
(sterilization) on 62 teen-age inmates of a Kansas reforma-
tory as retribution for disorderly behavior. 14 
Any difference in the ethical repugnance of 
these real and hypothetical cases, and of the compulsory 
treatment of the illicit drug user, is in degree only. As Szasz 
(a psychiatrist) has pointed out, "Physicians who interfere 
with the medical patients' autonomy by treating them 
involuntarily are guilty of an offense, punishable by both 
civil and criminal statutes. Why should this not apply to 
similar offenses against mental patients?" 15 Szasz does not 
condition his condemnation in any way on treatment 
outcome: 
11 New York Daily News, Sept. 7, 1971. IS T. Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry 
253 (1963). 12 T. Szasz, in Medical Opinion and Review 
35 (May, 1968). 
13 Webster's New World Dictionary of the 
American Language 1636, (1964). 
14 Note, What Has Happened to Kansas' 
Sterilization Laws?, 2 Kansas Law 
Review 174, at 176-177 (1953-1954). 
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pontentially more ominous 
than failure 
Treating patients against their wishes, even 
though the treatment may be medically correct, 
should be considered an offense punishable by 
law. Let us not forget that every form of social 
oppression has, at some time during its history, 
been justified on the ground of helpfulness 
toward the oppressed. 16 (emphasis added) 
A keystone of the arguments favoring 
compulsory treatment is that meaningful therapy can be 
an·d is provided. In the words of a presidential Commission 
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 
It is essential that the commitment laws be 
construed and executed to serve the purpose 
for which they were intended and by which 
alone they can be justified. This purpose is 
treatment in fact and not merely confinement 
with the pretense of treatment. 17 
Moreover, to the extent that the treatment 
offered is ineffective, 18 serious doubts are raised concern-
ing the constitutionality of the use of civil commitment 
procedures by the statutory addict commitment programs. 
A 1969 decision of the New York Court of Appeals pt>inted 
out that: 
The extended period of deprivation of liberty 
which the statute [New York States's Narcotic 
Control Act] mandates can only be justified as 
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the 
program. 19 
It went on to say that: 
... If compulsory commitment turns out in 
fact to be a veneer for an extended jail term 
and is not a fully developed, comprehensive and 
effective scheme, it will have lost its claim to be 
a project devoted soley to curative ends. 
... The moment the program begins to serve 
the traditional purposes of criminal punish-
ment, such as deterence, preventive detention, 
or retribution, then the extended denial of 
liberty is simply no different from a prison 
sentence, and the constitutional guarantees 
applicable to criminal proceedings will apply in 
full measure. 20 (emphasis added) 
Whether the key criterion of effectiveness is in 
fact met is highly questionable. Reports on the results of 
involuntary treatment have been consistent in the grim 
picture they present of extremely high recidivism rates. 21 
Furthermore, in practice, this critical demonstration that 
compulsory programs are "fully developed, comprehensive 
and effective" is left to those responsible for the programs' 
operations. This is a weak foundation indeed upon which to 
permit and encourage the deprivation of liberties of tens of 
thousands of citizens. 
But to focus attention on the failure, in its own 
terms, of the treatment rationale for the incarceration of 
addicts ignores the fact that effectiveness, or "success,'' is a 
potentially far worse consequence for the unwilling subject. 
By definition, the involuntary patient enters the enforced 
therapeutic relationship rejecting that which the clinician 
sees as the desirable objective. Cure and rehabilitation 
therefore become synonymous with achieving that which 
the addict does not want, and this can be accomplished 
only by changing values and attitudes along with behavior. 
The all-powerful clinical director, acting for society, is the 
sole judge of what is healthy and appropriate. 
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The following excerpt from a military medical 
journal is an example of psychiatrically defined success 
which in medical terminology could be classified as 
iatrogenic psychosis (in plain language, medical intervention 
which has destroyed an individual's ability to perceive and 
appropriately respond to reality): 
... Fear of Flying: A 26 year old Sgt. AC 47 
gunner with 7 months active duty in RVN, 
presented with frank admission of fear of 
flying. He had flown over 100 missions, and 
loss of several aircraft and loss of several crews 
who were well known to the patient, pre-
cipitated his visit. He stated he would give up 
flight pay, promotion, medals, etc., just to stop 
flying. Psychiatric consultation to USAF 
Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay, resulted in 36 days 
hospitalization with use of psychotherapy and 
tranquilizers. Diagnosis was Gross Stress 
Reaction, manifest by anxiety, tenseness, a fear 
of death expressed in the form of rationaliza-
tions and inability to function. His problem was 
worked through and insight to his problem was 
gained to the extent that he was returned to 
full flying duty in less than 6 weeks. This is a 
fine tribute to the psychiatrists at Cam Ranh 
Bay (633 Combat Spt. Gp. Dispensary, Pleiku 
AB). 22 
16 /d.,.185, 253. 
It is unclear from this case history whether the 
sergeant was a voluntary or involuntary patient, though it 
would appear that he presented his superiors (and the 
doctors) with a firm decision to stop flying rather than with 
a symptom of illness for which he sought help. The 
conflicts inherent in attempting to modify behavior, 
however, are always present when practitioners relate to 
addicts compelled to accept their services: the clinician 
defines the disease and makes the diagnosis; the clinician 
decides on the therapeutic goals and implements the 
procedures he hopes will achieve these goals, though ~h~Y_ 
are openly rejected by the patient; and, finally, the ch~cian 
measures the effectiveness of treatment. Should he decide 
that the therapy is not sufficiently successful, it is the 
patient who pays the price of continued, unwanted 
treatment. 
It is naive to assume that the power which is 
given the practitioner over the involuntary patient will not 
be applied to its fullest degree. The following candid 
statement outlines what society expects its agents-the 
clinicians-to accomplish: 
From the addict's point of view, he properly 
perceives that the therapist is, in fact, trying to 
engage him in a conventional life, which will 
often mean low pay and prestige, continued 
insecurity, and poor access to the goals of our 
affluent society. This conformity, which 
society demands of the addict, is neither 
respected nor valued when it is achieved. 23 
(emphasis added) 
Like the Air Force sergeant who, understandably, did not 
want to fly again but returned to flying duty after 
"treatment," these patients are considered "successful" 
when they are willing to accept whatever grim reality is 
considered by others to be appropriate. 
Drug abuse, per se, is the activity which, once 
labelled an illness, forms the spurious medico-legal rationale 
for permitting unwanted treatment to be forced on the 
addict. The objectives of the "rehabilitation" process, 
however, will almost invariably be far b!oader than simply 
eliminating the illicit use of drugs. All other forms of 
behavior which the clinician believes, on the basis of his 
own and society's prejudices, to be pathological will also be 
dealt with. 
21 See note 18, supra. 
17 President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of 
Justice, Task Force Report: Narcotics 
and Drug Abuse 16 (1967). 
22 11 PACAF Medical Journal 5, no. 8 
(July, 1967). 
23 B. Brill and L. Lieberman, Authority 
and Addictwn, 51 (1969). 
18 E. Brecher, supra, note 2, 64-89. 
19 People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y. 2d 292, at 301 
(1969). 
20 Id., at 302, 303. 
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find his sexual preference a focus of the therapist, while the 
non-addict homosexual (despite the acknowledged burdens 
which society imposes) can not be deprived of his liberty or 
forced into undergoing therapy in most states. The same is 
true of the involuntarily committed addict who belongs to 
a bizarre religious sect; or who is a member of a radical 
political group; or who engages in any other activity which 
does not have the blessings of the general population and is 
thus classified as "deviant" and an additional component of 
the "symptom" complex. Some proponents of compulsory 
treatment define the broad nature of their goals quite 
explicitly: 
To alter, where indicated, the attitudes and 
behaviors of the addict in the areas of: 
a work 
b friendship and heterosexual relationships 
c family responsibility 
d leisure time activities 
e criminality. 24 
It goes without saying that the clinician decides when 
changes are "indicated," and the involuntary patient is 
compelled to acquiesce, as a prerequisite to discharge. 
Consequences of Abandoning Involuntary 
Treatment 
It would be wrong to assume that arguments 
against involuntary treatment in any way denigrate the 
value and importance of voluntary services. Although a law 
mandating treatment of everyone over a specified weight 
would be unthinkable, people who are obese should have 
acces~ to medical assistance for weight reduction if they 
want 1t. 
Moreover, the continued counter-productive 
and inhumane imprisonment of addicts is not an inevitable 
consequence of eliminating coercive referrals for 
treatment. The number and type of people incarcerated is a 
reflection of the orientation and emphasis of enforcement 
agencies, prosecutors and the judiciary. Rounding up drug 
users and imposing long jail terms for charges of possession 
of "dangerous drugs" is admittedly no more rational or 
productive than sentencin-g such people to therapy. The 
continuation of such practices is simply the realization in 
concrete terms of the inconsistencies in the thinking of the 
Supreme Court in the well-known case of Robinson v. 
California: while ruling that the application of criminal 
penalties to the status of addiction per se violated the 
constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the 
Court nonetheless simultaneously and explicitly approved 
criminal penalties for the use and possession of drugs that 
addiction entails. 25 
It should also be emphasized that the 
arguments against the compulsory treatment of addicts in 
no way lessen the desirability of the retention of alterna-
tives in the criminal justice system to incarceration, such as 
parole and probation. Rather, they are directed only against 
the use of parole and probation to coerce people into 
accepting therapy. 
lf compulsory treatment as a form of punish-
ment is to be eliminated, this would simultaneously 
preclude the addict-defendant from pleading illness as a 
justification for crime, or as a rationale for avoiding the 
usual penalties which the court imposes on non-addicts for 
similar offenses. Equal severity of the law is no less a 
principle than the corollary equal protection. The 
proposition that incarceration of convicted criminals serves 
no useful purpose may well be correct; whatever alterna-
tives are suggested, however, should not distinguish 
between people on the basis of drug abuse. 
Finally, in contemplating the impact of 
eliminating involuntary treatment of addicts, it is well to 
consider the insignificant role involuntary treatment plays 
in two countries where addiction seems to have been 
contained, England and Japan. 
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English laws, though reputedly dealing with 
addiction as a medical rather than criminal problem, do not 
actually compel anyone to enter treatment. Nor is t~e 
addict offered a "choice" of therapy in lieu of pre-tnal 
detention, or as a condition of release from jail after 
conviction. Thus, eliminating criminal sanctions for the 
state of addiction and the associated possession and use of 
addicting drugs does not require a concomitant policy of 
forcing drug abusers into treatment. 
In the case of Japan, the 1963 Narcotics 
Control Law did provide for compulsory hospitalization. At 
the same time, however, this statute heralded a massive 
enforcement effort against narcotics importation and 
trafficking, launched by a police department with a 
reputation for absolute incorruptabilit~. These ~act?rs and 
others in the ensuing six years resulted m a decline m the 
estimated number of heroin addicts from 40,000 to a few 
hundred. 26 The role of involuntary hospitalization in this 
achievement was insignificant during the six year period 
only 593 people were forced to accept treatme~t, a.nd it is 
relevant to note that in Japan treatment of addicts 1s never 
. . . 27 
a substitute for prosecut10n or incarceration. 
The principle is, that the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He can not rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be wise, or even right. 
These are good reasons for remonstrating with 
him or reasoning with him, or persuading him, 
or entreating him, but not for compelling him, 
or visiting him with an evil in case he do 
otherwise. 28 
24 Id., 112. 
Whatever the terminology used and whatever 
the means by which coercion is applied, compulsory 
treatment of addicts is void of benefits and counter-
productive of the goals which form the rationale for . 
depriving people of their liberty. The interests of society 
can not possibly be pr<?tected by ineffective attempts to 
force attitudinal and behavioral change on resentful and 
unwilling subjects; the rights of all Americans are severely 
threatened when the principle is established of ignoring 
safeguards of our criminal justice system. The assertion that 
compulsory treatment is in the interests of those who are 
forced into therapy is equally spurious; such efforts have 
been proven a costly, unsuccessful error in the past, and 
they are doomed to fail in the future. 
There is little doubt that proposals such as the 
following will become more common as the addiction 
problem remains unsolved: . . .. 
A prominent New York City politician has 
called for a crack-down on violent crime by 
interning hard-core narcotics addicts in 
treatment camps ... 'if that's what they 
need.' 29 
Concern over such proposed "solutions," which are as 
inevitably self-defeating as they are radical, should not 
obscure the fact that the more subtle forms of compulsory 
treatment are an even greater danger. 
25 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, at 
664 (1962). 
26 Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, A 
Brief Account of Narcotics Abuse and 
Countermeasures in Japan, 7 ( 1970). 
27 Id., 9. 
28 J. Mill, On Liberty, and Other Essays 13 
(l 926). 
29 S. Leone, quoted in N. Y. Times, Dec. 
12, 1971. 
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